| A task seems easy |
Ask whether it is easy only for a human brain. |
Tasks easy for us are often “astronomically difficult” for machines (chess vs dishwashing). |
| An AI beats humans at a task |
Don’t conclude it solves the task the way humans do. |
A calculator beats humans at arithmetic without understanding math. |
| A model divides the brain into stacked layers |
Reject it. |
Instinct, emotion and cognition span the whole brain (the myth of layers). |
| A stimulus’s meaning depends on context |
Model valence as a function of internal state. |
The same signal is good, bad or neutral depending on need. |
| An association fails once after a long record |
Suppress it but expect it back. |
The failure may be a fluke (spontaneous recovery). |
| A reward comes long after the actions |
Learn from changes in predicted reward. |
Reinforcing recent or all moves fails (temporal credit assignment). |
| A reward is fully expected |
Expect no learning signal. |
Prediction cancels the reward; dopamine stays at baseline. |
| An expected reward is omitted |
Treat it as punishment, and an omitted punishment as reward. |
This is disappointment and relief; it needs precise timing. |
| The first reward is far away |
Add curiosity, not more random actions. |
Random exploration fails (Montezuma’s Revenge). |
| A network must keep learning after deployment |
Plan for catastrophic forgetting. |
Common practice is to freeze and retrain from scratch. |
| Predictions agree and nothing has changed |
Act on the habit. |
Simulating costs time and energy. |
| Costs are close to benefits, or rules or needs change |
Pause and simulate. |
That is when model-free values are wrong. |
| An imitation-learned system fails after small errors |
Infer the expert’s intent, or add a teacher who corrects in real time. |
Direct copying never shows how to recover. |
| You test for theory of mind |
Test what it thinks others know (false belief), not only what they want. |
Dogs, attentive as they are, fail to track what their trainer knows. |
| You plan for a future need while in a strong state |
Correct your forecast. |
Your current state inflates the predicted need. |
| A signal was learned for a reward |
Call it an imperative, not language. |
Any model-free learner can do that; language needs declarative labels and grammar. |
| An LLM answers commonsense questions |
Don’t infer a world model. |
RLHF and chain-of-thought can produce answers without one. |
| You give an AI a goal |
State the intended end state and its limits. |
Requests are not well-defined goals (the paper-clip problem). |
| A skill won’t train |
Change the curriculum before the learner. |
Both evolution and AI found that easier. |
| A trait helps the group but costs the individual |
Look for kin selection or punishment of defectors. |
Group benefit alone is not evolutionarily stable. |